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Abstract 
Responding to alarm systems which usually commit a number of false alarms and/or 
misses involves decision-making under uncertainty. Four laboratory experiments 
including a total of n=256 participants were conducted to gain comprehensive insight 
into humans’ dealing with this uncertainty. Specifically, it was investigated how 
responses to alarms/nonalarms are affected by the predictive validities of these events, 
and to what extent response strategies depend on whether or not the validity of 
alarms/nonalarms can be cross-checked against other data. Among others, the results 
suggest that, without cross-check possibility (experiment 1), low levels of predictive 
validity of alarms (≤0.5) led most participants to use one of two different strategies 
which both involved non-responding to a significant number of alarms (cry-wolf effect). 
Yet, providing access to alarm validity information reduced this effect dramatically 
(experiment 2). This latter result emerged independent of the effort needed for cross-
checkings of alarms (experiment 3), but was affected by the workload imposed by 
concurrent tasks (experiment 4). Theoretical and practical consequences of these results 
for decision-making and response selection in interaction with alarm systems, as well as 
the design of effective alarm systems are discussed.   
Keywords: decision-making, alarm system, compliance, reliance, cry-wolf effect 
Practitioner Summary 
Four laboratory experiments were performed to investigate the effects of false alarms 
and misses on the behavioural effectiveness of alarm-systems. The results provide 
insight in determinants of compliance with alarms, dependent on the alarm-system’s 
reliability, the possibility to cross-check the validity of alarms, and the workload 
imposed by concurrent tasks.   
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1. Introduction 
Alarm systems represent an important element of almost every complex human-
machine system. Usually they are implemented to support human operators in detecting 
critical system states or events which require some intervention. The most basic forms of 
these systems represent binary decision aids which remain silent (or show a green light) as 
long as some assessed parameters are within a pre-defined target range of nominal operation, 
and provide an alerting signal (e.g. a loud tone or red light) in case of deviations. Due to 
inherent technical limitation and noisy data from the environment, binary alarm systems are 
never perfectly reliable. That is, they can miss critical events or produce false alarms. This 
represents a challenge for human operators who usually have the final responsibility for the 
overall safety of a process and needs to decide whether and how to respond to a given output 
of an alarm system. This raises a number of issues related to how  operators’ responses to 
alarms are affected by the perceived properties of the system, the experiences made with it, or 
the situational context (e.g. workload). For example, it has been shown, that humans who 
have made the repeated experience of false alarms start to mistrust the alarm system and tend 
to respond slower to alarms (Getty et al. 1995; Wickens and Colcombe 2007) or even to 
ignore future alarms completely (Bliss, Gilson, and Deaton 1995; Lees and Lee 2007). The 
practical significance of proper dealing with imperfect alarm systems is reflected by analyses 
suggesting that a significant number of accidents and incidents in process control or aviation 
can be traced back to inappropriate responses to alarms (Bliss and Fallon 2006; Bliss 2003a; 
Bransby and Jenkinson 1998). The current research includes a series of four laboratory 
experiments which were performed to gain a better understanding of human decision-making  
in interaction with alarms and its relationship to characteristics of the alarm system as well as 
to the situational context.  In accordance  with others, e.g., Sorkin and Woods (1985) and 
Meyer (2004), we propose that human interaction with alarm systems be considered an issue 
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of decision-making under uncertainty. The following questions are addressed: To what extent 
depend human responses to alarms on the predictive value of alarms and what strategies and 
heuristics are applied to deal with uncertainty in this case? How are response strategies 
modified if the uncertainty of single alarms can be reduced by cross-checking their validity 
towards other information? What significance have context factors like effort of alarm 
verification or overall workload on decision-making and responses to alarms? 
 
1.1. Background: Properties of Alarm Systems  
Any binary alarm system represents an automated decision aid which classifies states 
of a process or the environment into two categories: normal vs. critical. The performance of 
such system can be described by its hit rate (pH), defined as proportion of correctly indicated 
critical events (hits) out of all events being in fact critical, and its false alarm rate (pFA), i.e. 
proportion of falsely emitted alarms out of all non-critical events. Formally, the basic 
properties of a system leading to this performance can be modelled by means of signal 
detection theory (SDT, Green and Swets 1966), i.e. in terms of its sensitivity (d’) and 
response criterion (c).  This has been described in detail elsewhere (cf. Meyer and Bitan 2002; 
Parasuraman, Hancock, and Olofinboba 1997; Sorkin and Woods 1985) and shall not be 
repeated here. 
More important for an understanding of the behavioral efficiency of alarm systems are 
two other properties which have been referred to as  the positive and negative predictive value 
(PPV and NPV;  Getty et al. 1995; Meyer and Bitan, 2002).  The PPV represents the 
conditional probability that there really is a critical event (E) in case of an alarm (A), which 
directly depends on the number of hits and false alarms produced by a system. Formally, it is 
defined as follows: 

alarmsfalsehits
hits
AEpPPV

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The NPV represents the conditional probability that there is no critical event (nonE) in 
case that no alarm (nonA) has emitted and is defined as follows. 
 
missesrejectionscorrect
rejectionscorrect
nonAnonEpNPV

 |
 
Considering the PPV and NPV is especially important because it can be assumed that 
operators, based on their experience, may gain a more or less proper picture of the PPV and 
NPV of their alarms systems but not the underlying technical properties like pH and pFA. 
Notable in the current context is that the PPV and the NPV do not only depend on the 
technological features of a given alarm system alone, but also on the a priori probability or 
base rate of critical events (Getty et al. 1995; Meyer and Bitan 2002; Parasuraman et al. 
1997). Specifically, the PPV of an alarm decreases significantly with decreasing base rates. 
For the NPV the opposite is true: with decreasing base rates NPV tends to increase. This has 
two important consequences: First, even alarm systems with high hit and low false alarm rates 
can have a very low PPV in case that the base rate of a failure is low (Meyer and Bitan 2002; 
Parasuraman et al. 1997). Second, PPV and NPV represent two distinct aspects of predictive 
validity of alarm systems which are negatively correlated.  
 
1.2. Background: Responding to Alarms as Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
Basically, working with alarm systems can be considered as a decision-making task, 
i.e. operators need to decide whether or not to become active and respond in a proper way in 
case an alarm has been triggered, or whether or not to remain passive in case of nonalarms. 
The specific challenges of making these decisions depend directly on whether or not alarm 
validity information (AVI) is available that can be accessed by human operators in order to 
cross-check the output of the alarm system (Sorkin and Woods 1985).  
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Let us first consider the situation where AVI is not available. Examples for this 
situation include remote smoke detectors or an in-flight icing alert in the cockpit. The decision 
to be made in this case typically represents a decision under uncertainty with the degree of 
uncertainty directly depending on the PPV and NPV of the alarm system (Meyer 2004). In 
accordance with these two properties, two different behavioral aspects have been 
distinguished and referred to as compliance and reliance (Meyer 2001, 2004). Compliance 
refers to the extent operators respond to a given alarm in accordance with the alarm, i.e. by 
initiating all actions necessary in case of a critical event or malfunction. Reliance refers to the 
extent to which operators refrain from any action unless the alarm goes off. Theoretically, 
rational compliance and reliance decisions can be modelled based on expected values 
considerations assuming that operators have detailed knowledge about the PPV and NPV as 
well as about the consequences (benefits and costs) of correct or false decisions (Meyer 
2004). Operators following such rational considerations would be expected to apply what has 
been coined an extreme responding strategy in reponse to alarms (Bliss et al. 1995). That is, 
they would either respond to all alarms in the expected way or ignore all of them, dependent 
on whether the perceived PPV of the alarm system were higher or lower compared to their 
response criterion. However, as is known from many other domains, judgments and decisions 
under uncertainty hardly ever follow pure rational considerations but more or less proper 
decision heuristics (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Kahnemann, Slovic and Tversky 1982). In 
accordance with this, a response strategy other than extreme responding has also been 
observed in alarm research and referred to as probability matching (Bliss et al. 1995; Bliss 
2003b).  Applying this second strategy, operators follow the output of an alarm system in a 
frequency that corresponds more or less to the described or perceived reliability in terms of 
PPV and NPV. That is, if they are told (or experience) that about 80% of all alarms will be 
correct, they tend to follow about 80% of all alarms.  
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The decision-making process becomes even more complex if operators have the 
possibility to reduce the level of uncertainty related to a given output of an alarm system by 
cross-checking its validity with other available information. In this case, operators have three 
different behavioral alternatives to respond to a given alarm, i.e. they can directly comply 
with it, ignore it, or cross-check it before deciding how to respond. However, cross-checking 
usually is time consuming and, thus, involves costs that need to be traded-off against 
concurrent goals, e.g., to respond as quickly as possible, or to continue performing concurrent 
tasks which need to be done. As a consequence, it can be assumed that decision-making of 
operators in this case involves two different sub-stages (Allendoerfer, Pai and Friedman-Berg  
2008). Decision-making on the first sub-stage is equivalent to the one described above for the 
situation without AVI. If the predictive validity of an alarm system’s output is perceived as 
sufficiently high or too low, operators will probably either follow the system directly without 
investing the effort of own information sampling, or just ignore it. However, in all other cases 
a second sub-stage of more effortful decision-making will be entered by first cross-checking 
other information in order to reduce the uncertainty related to the advice of the alarm system 
before a final response decision is made.  
 
1.3. Prior relevant  research 
Thus far, research has mainly focused on the compliance component in response to 
alarms and especially the so called “cry-wolf” effect in response to a high frequency of false 
alarms (Bresnitz 1984). Several studies support the notion that experiencing a high number of 
false alarms (indicative of a low PPV)  leads operators to respond only slowly to alarms or to 
ignore alarms completely (e.g. Bliss et al. 1995; Bliss and Dunn 2000; Bliss, Jeans, and 
Prioux 1996; Bresnitz 1984, Dixon, Wickens, and McCarley 2007; Getty et al. 1995; Maltz 
and Shinar 2003). First insights in the relationship between PPV and compliance have been 
provided by studies of Getty et al. (1995) and Bliss et al. (1995).  Getty et al. (1995) found 
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immediate and quick responses predominating for PPVs of .39 and beyond, but a clear shift to 
slow response times reflecting a cry-wolf effect for the lowest PPV they considered (.25). The 
data of Bliss et al. (1995) provide some evidence for the significance of the probability 
matching heuristic in coping with the uncertainty of alarms. By analysing responses to alarms 
with PPVs of .25, .50 and .75 they found that the majority of participants chose a sort of 
probability matching strategy, leading to an increasing proportion of ignored alarms with 
decreasing PPV. Only a minority of participants (about 10%) applied the more rational 
extreme responding strategy by either responding to all or no alarms in the .75 and .25 
condition, respectively.  
Comparatively less is known about the effect of imperfect alarm systems on the 
reliance component and the relationship of compliance and reliance. According to Meyer 
(2004) compliance and reliance represent independent aspects of dependence on alarm 
systems with compliance mainly affected by the PPV (or false alarms) and reliance by the 
NPV (or misses). Whereas some research support this notion (Dixon and Wickens 2006; 
Meyer 2001; Meyer and Bitan 2002; Wickens and Colcombe 2007), other results challenge it 
by providing evidence for non-selective effects of false alarms on complicance as well as 
reliance (e.g. Dixon et al. 2007;  Rice 2009; Meyer, Wiczorek and Guenzler 2013). Another 
important aspect which has been rarely addressed in previous research is how compliance and 
reliance of operators in interaction with alarms are affected by the availability of AVI (e.g. 
Bliss 2003b; Bustamante 2005).  Bustamante (2005) analysed to what extent the provision of 
AVI would improve human decision-making in interaction with an alarm system with a 
PPV=.18. Not surprinsingly he found that providing  AVI contributed to a better 
discrimination between true and false alarms under these conditions. More interesting results 
were presented by Bliss (2003b). His review of a set of his own studies suggests that the 
tendency for extreme responding to alarms with medium to high PPVs depends on the 
availability of AVI. Whereas only low rates of extreme responding (0-12%) were observed in 
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studies where AVI was available, these rates increased up to 52% in situations without AVI. 
However, only conditions with alarm PPVs of 0.50 to 0.75  were included in this research 
which raises the question to what extent these results also apply to alarms with  PPVs<0.50 
which are much more common in real field settings.  
 
1.4. Current Research 
The main objective of the current research is to investigate how decision-making in 
response to alarms is affected by the PPV, and, even more important, to what extent this 
decision-making and response strategies change if AVI is available. The latter aspect is of 
considerable practical relevance. If it was shown, for example, that known biases and issues 
related to the uncertainty of alarms, e.g. the “cry wolf” effect, could be reduced by providing 
AVI, this would have direct implications for the design of effective alarm systems. Similar to 
other research (e.g. Bliss et al. 1995; Dixon et al. 2007), the alarm task used for the present 
research was part of a multi-task environment. This made it possible not only to evaluate the 
performance consequences of interacting with alarm systems of varying reliability on alarm 
decision-making itself, but also on concurrent task performance. However, in contrast to prior 
research a broader range of PPVs was considered, including extreme low and high PPVs.  
Furthermore, an alarm system was used that did not only produce false alarms but also misses, 
albeit to a considerably lesser degree. This made it possible to not only evaluate effects of 
different PPVs on responses to given alarms but also to explore possible effects of different 
NPVs on the reliance component at the same time with the same system.  
A series of four experiments was conducted using essentially the same multi-task 
paradigm. Participants had to perform two or three concurrent tasks, including one quality 
control task which was supported by an alarm system. The PPV of alarms was varied 
systematically within each experiment by varying the base rate of critical events. More 
specifically, five different conditions were compared in each experiment with PPVs of alarms 
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of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. Note that the variation of base rates producing these PPVs also 
involved varying NPVs for nonalarm events which differed between 0.98 and 0.41.  
The first experiment addressed the impact of the different PPVs on responses of 
operators in a situation where no AVI was available. It was expected that, in this case, 
participants would base their decision about how to respond to an alarm directly on the PPV. 
More specifically, it was hypothesized that the majority of participants would use a sort of 
probability matching strategy for PPVs ranging from 0.3 to 0.7, and only a minority would 
exhibit a positive or negative extreme responding. This would be in accordance with the 
earlier findings of Bliss et al. (1995) and Bliss (2003a). However, with respect to the more 
extreme conditions (0.1 and 0.9) extreme responding becomes a specific case of probability 
matching. Therefore it was expected that in these conditions extreme responding would be the 
dominant response pattern, i.e. participants were expected to  comply with every alarm in 
conditions 0.9, and to ignore every alarm, i.e. exhibit an extreme “cry wolf” effect, in 
conditions where PPV=0.1.    
The second experiment replicated the first one in most aspects but offered the 
availability of AVI. Participants were able to cross-check the validity of a given alarm (or 
nonalarm) event against raw data. Yet, checking these data needed some time that had to be 
subtracted from another (concurrent) task. Thus, participants had to trade-off the possibility to 
reduce uncertainty to the possibility to work on the concurrent task. It was expected that in 
this case using the cross-check option in response to given alarms would follow an inverted-U 
shape function across different levels of PPV. Alarms would be cross-checked most often in 
case of maximum uncertainty (PPV=0.5) and least often in case of least uncertainty, 
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independent of whether the PPV is extremely high  (0.9) or low (0.1).1  For events with least 
uncertainty, an extreme responding strategy was expected to remain the dominant behavior.  
The third and fourth experiments capitalized on the second one and investigated how 
the pattern of effects found in the second experiment would be altered in case of raised effort 
needed for cross-checks (Exp. 3) or overall workload imposed by the addition of another 
concurrent tasks (Exp. 4). It was expected that these interventions would reduce the number 
of cross-checks and raise the probability of direct responding to or ignoring of alarms in 
conditions with PPV>0.5 and PPV<0.5, respectively.   
Although the impact of the PPV on responses to alarms was the main focus of 
research, we also looked at possible effects of NPV on the reliance component, and to what 
extent participants distinguished between both aspects in their responses to alarms and 
nonalarms. Based on the original reasoning of Meyer (2004) it was assumed that participants 
would clearly discriminate between the PPV and NPV of the different outputs of the alarm 
system and that their responses to nonalarms would be mainly guided by the NPV of these 
events. In addition, we looked for any indications of cross-effects of false alarms and misses 
on the reliance and compliance component, respectively. However, since the design of the 
experiments was not specifically tailored to a detection of such effects, this part of research 
remained explorative.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants  
                                                 
1 Note that alarm systems with PPVs of 0.1. and 0.9, albeit representing very different systems in 
terms of reliability are equivalent with respect to the level of uncertainty associated with alarms. 
Humans interacting with these systems can be sure that 90% of alarms are either wrong or correct, 
respectively, i.e. they face the same low uncertainty in making their decision how to respond. 
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56 students (27 females, 29 males, mean age: 26.98 years) participated in the 
experiment. Participants were screened not to suffer from any distortion of color vision which 
might interfere with the experiment (i.e. red-green color blindness). They were randomly 
assigned to the experimental conditions and received a basic payment of € 7 for their 
participation plus a bonus payment of maximal € 8 depending on their performance during the 
experiment.  
2.1.2. Task 
A PC-based laboratory task, M-TOPS-A (Multi-Task Operator Performance 
Simulation for Alarm Research), was used for the experiment. M-TOPS-A is a multi-task 
environment including up to three different tasks which have to be performed simultaneously. 
The tasks are chosen to require basic cognitive demands similar to those required from 
operators in the control room of a chemical plant, namely a Resource Ordering Task, a 
Coolant Exchange Task, and an Alarm Task. The latter task represents the most important task 
in the present context. The interface of M-TOPS-A is shown in Figure 1. The different tasks 
are described in the following: 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Resource Ordering Task (ROT). This task represents a mental arithmetic task which is shown 
in the upper left quadrant of the interface. Participants are instructed that they always have to 
assure the availability of required chemicals in order to keep the chemical process running. 
For this purpose, the actual and the set value of an ascertained chemical is presented. 
Participants then have to calculate the difference, type the result in the designated ordering 
field, and initiate the order by mouse-clicking on the order button. Participants have 15 
seconds to respond to a given request. After an order has been sent, a new task is presented 
after a fixed interval of three seconds. Alternatively, the participant can actively initiate a new 
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task by clicking on the arrow button. As performance measure, the number of correctly sent 
orders per given time period is sampled.   
Coolant Exchange Task (CET). This task demands the execution of different actions in a 
given sequence. According to the instruction these actions are needed to exchange the coolant 
in different sub-systems of the plant. For this purpose, different sets of two coolant tanks each 
are shown in the upper right part of the interface. In order to exchange the used coolant with 
new one, participants have to open and close the different valves of the sub-system in a 
predefined sequence. Due to inherent time-constants, a complete exchange-cycle takes a 
minimum of 40 seconds plus the time-delays produced by participants at different steps of the 
action sequence. After each completed exchange of coolant indicated by a change of the color 
of the tank from green (used coolant) to grey (empty)  to blue (fresh coolant), participants 
have to activate the sub-system by a mouse-click on a button and a new set of tanks 
representing another sub-systems is displayed. As a performance measure the number of 
completed replacements of coolant within a given time period  is counted. 
Alarm Task (AT). This task demands decision-making in interaction with an alarm system. 
The interface for this task is shown in the lower right quadrant of Figure 1. Participants are 
instructed that the plant has a control system which automatically monitors and assesses the 
quality of the chemical end-product filled in single containers. In case the quality of a given 
container is assessed to fulfill a predefined quality criterion (“molecular weight ok”), a green 
light is emitted indicating that the state of the product is approved. However, in case the 
system detects an impaired product (“molecular weight too high”) a visual alarm (red light) 
goes off, combined with a message displayed on an alarm state monitor. Upon getting the 
output of the alarm system, the operator has to decide how to respond to it, i.e. by letting the 
container pass (staying passive) or  by clicking the rework button. Note that the former is the 
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suggested response to nonalarms and the latter the suggested response to alarms. Upon 
clicking the rework button, the relevant parameter (“temperature”) can be chosen by another 
mouse-click from an one-item menu. Because the alarm system is not perfectly reliable and 
the validity of given alarms cannot be double-checked  with other data, this involves a typical 
decision under uncertainty, comparable to what is often the case in real-world settings.  
For the present series of experiments the hit rate of the alarm system was defined as 
0.8 and the false alarm rate was 0.4. In terms of signal-detection theory, these characteristics 
correspond to a sensitivity of d’=1.09 and a comparatively liberal response bias c = -0.29. 
That is, given low base rates of critical events (p<0.5), the system is clearly false alarm prone 
(like most real systems) but also produces at least some misses, depending on the specific 
base rate of critical events. Only with high base rates (>0.8) the system eventually turns into a 
miss prone system which produces more misses than false alarms. This characteristic makes it 
possible to study both, effects of the system on the compliance as well as on the reliance of 
the operator.  
Containers passed the control station with a frequency of about six containers per 
minute. After entering the control station the containers remained there for five seconds. 
During this time window participants could decide whether or not to intervene in response to 
the output of the alarm system. For each container and output of the alarm system (“green” vs. 
“red”) the kind of response of the participant  (no response vs. rework) was logged. In 
addition, it was recorded whether or not the response of the participant was correct. Correct 
decisions in response to the output of the alarm system include “no response” in case of 
correct rejections and false alarms emitted by the system, and “clicking on the rework icon” in 
case of hits or misses of the system, respectively.  
 
2.1.3. Design 
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For experiment #1, only two of the three tasks had to be performed concurrently, 
namely the ROT and AT. The experimental design included two factors. The first factor 
(alarm reliability) was defined as a between-subject factor and included five levels 
corresponding to five different PPVs of the alarms emitted by the alarm system in the AT. 
The levels included PPVs equaling 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 and were operationally 
established by varying the base rates of critical events to be detected by the alarm system. 
Note that this variation of base rates also affected the NPV of alarms, albeit to a much lesser 
extent. The full information about the different experimental conditions defining the first 
experimental factor in terms of number of participants in each group, base rates of critical 
events and basic characteristics of the alarm system (i.e. d’, c, PPV and NPV) are provided in 
Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The second factor included a two-level within-subjects factor capturing possible time-
on-task effects on the development of response strategies. Participants had to perform two 
blocks of trials. During each block a total of 100 decisions had to be made in response to the 
outputs of the alarm system in the AT.  
 
2.1.4. Dependent Variables 
Three sets of data were sampled to analyse response strategies and their performance 
consequences in the alarm task: (1) Response rates, defined as the proportion of direct 
responses (activating the menu for selecting the impaired container and clicking on rework 
button) to given alarms (“red light”) and  nonalarms (“green lights”). Note that direct response 
to a nonalarm  is indicative of a participant not relying on the system’s output.  (2) Individual 
response strategies. In order to describe the type of individual response strategies chosen in 
response to alarms and nonalarms, we looked at the number of participants who used an 
extreme strategy in response to given alarms and nonalarms. A response strategy was 
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considered “extreme” if 90% or more of given outputs were either completely ignored (no 
response; “negative extreme responding”) or directly responded to (“positive extreme 
responding”). Any other response frequencies which represented a mix of alarms ignored and 
responded to are referred to as “mixed strategy” in the following.  (3) Overall performance, 
defined as the overall number of correct decisions (human and alarm system together) in 
response to alarms (and nonalarms).  A decision in response to a given alarm was considered 
to be correct if the operator responded to a hit of the alarm system with the expected response 
but did not respond to a false alarm. In case of nonalarms, decisions were considered to be 
correct if the operator did not respond to correct rejections of the system but overwrote the 
system and responded by mouse-clicking on the “rework” button if the system produced a 
miss.  
In addition to these the data sets for AT performance, we also assessed the 
consequences of interaction with the AT for concurrent task performance in the ROT. 
Performance in this latter task was assessed by numbers of correct orderings sent.  
 
2.1.5. Procedure 
The experiment was conducted with groups of up to four participants. After 
completing a demographic questionnaire and reading the instructions, participants were 
familiarized with M-TOPS-A. They were told that the experiment was a simulation of a 
control room of a chemical plant and that their task was to keep the chemical process running 
while controlling the quality of the end-product simultaneously. After practicing the ROT and 
AT separately for two minutes each, participants completed a 100-trial training block with the 
AT only, in order to get familiarized with the characteristics of the alarm system. They were 
instructed that the alarm system would not work perfectly reliable and that they should use the 
training block to gain experience with its reliability. Only for that training block an auditory 
feedback was given that informed participants whether or not their decision in response to the 
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output of the alarm system was correct. The feedback was provided via headphones and 
included an acoustical signal (“buzzer”) whenever the decision made in response to the output 
of the alarm system was wrong (i.e. in case that participants responded to a false alarm or did 
not respond to a green light although it was a miss). After completion of the practice block 
they provided subjective estimates about the characteristics of the alarm system in terms of 
numbers of hits, correct rejections, false alarms, and misses per 100 trials, which usually were 
quite close to the original numbers with slight deviations only in the most extreme PPV 
conditions. Then participants were explicitly informed about the actual characteristics by 
providing them a matrix showing the “real” distribution of the different outputs. This 
combination of providing information about the alarm system by experience as well as by 
description was done in order to avoid the impact of any decision bias related to only 
experience-based vs. description-based information (Hertwig and Erev 2009).    
The following two experimental blocks again included 100 trials of the AT task and 
lasted about 13 minutes, each. Hits, CRs, FAs and misses of the alarm system were presented 
in a random and unpredictable order. Although it cannot be fully excluded, this presentation 
mode rendered it highly unlikely that the participants could base their guesses on the 
identification of specific patterns instead of the probability information. With respect to task 
priority setting during these blocks, participants were instructed that they had to perform both 
tasks concurrently with the same priority. This was also supported by the pay-off structure 
defining the number of points which could be “earned” in the different tasks. Participants 
receive 1.5 points for every correct order of chemicals (ROT). For the alarm task they were 
granted two points for a correct response but lost two points with each wrong response. This 
payoff-structure took into account that the two tasks had different time characteristics and 
should ensure that all tasks were treated as equally important. The financial compensation for 
participation in the experiments was partially dependent on the overall amount of points 
gained, i.e. participants could more than double their basic compensation with high scores.  
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2.1.6. Statistical Analysis 
Performance data were analysed by a multifactorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Given the sample size and the basic characteristics of the experimental design, the 
assumptions of this approach can be regarded as fulfilled. The  F-test would even remain 
robust against slight deviations from the assumption of  normal distribution of data or 
homogeneity of variances (e.g. Kirk, 1982; Stevens 2007).  Post-hoc contrasts between single 
means were conducted by Scheffé tests which represent the most conservative approach for 
this purpose.   
 
2.2. Results  
 
2.2.1. Alarm Task:  Mean response rates and individual response strategies  
Mean response rates to alarms, i.e. average percentage of instances where participants 
complied with the alarm, are shown in Figure 2 (upper panel left). As becomes evident, mean 
response rates directly varied dependent on the PPV of alarms, and this general pattern 
became even more extreme as a result of task practice (block 2 vs. block 1). In block 2 only 
about 16% of all alarms were responded to in the conditions with the lowest PPV (0.1). In 
contrast, almost all alarms were complied with in the two conditions with highest alarm PPV 
(0.7, 0.9). Moreover, a noticeable step increase of response rates occurred between the 0.5 and 
0.7 condition. A 5(condition) x 2 (block) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second 
factor revealed significant main effects of condition, F(4, 51)= 14.78, p< .01, p2= .54, and a 
significant interaction effect, F(4, 51)= 4.61, p<.01, p2= .27.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
On first sight this pattern of mean response rates suggests that the participants had 
used an almost ideal probability matching strategy for responding to alarms, at least for 
conditions with PPV≤ 0.5. However, a closer look to individual data revealed, that this pattern 
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was actually due to a different mix of response strategies used by the participants in the 
different conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (medium left panel). The figure shows the 
number of participants who applied the different response strategies distinguished above in 
the different experimental conditions. Only data from block 2 were taken into consideration 
for this analysis. Aggregated across all conditions, the majority of participants (n=35) actually 
used a sort of extreme responding strategy.  Positive extreme responding represented the 
strategy used by the vast majority of participants in the 0.7 and 0.9 condition. Actually, n=16 
(out of 21) participants in these two conditions responded to almost all alarms, and just n=5 
participants in the 0.7 condition used a mixed strategy. In contrast, negative extreme 
responders, who ignored more than 90% of all alarms, only were observed in conditions with 
an alarm PPV of 0.5 or less, and their number increased with decreasing PPV. Yet, in all of 
these conditions, also a significant number of participants were found who applied a mixed 
strategy, and in the 0.5 condition the number of participants using a mixed strategy was even 
higher than the number of extreme responders. In order to analyze to what extent the mixed 
strategies corresponded to a probability matching strategy, the individual response rates to 
alarms in the different conditions were contrasted to the PPV value by simple t-tests. Only the 
data of the participants using a mixed strategy were included in these analyses. It turned out 
that only for the 0.3 condition, the individual mixed-strategy response rates (mean: 0.47) did 
not differ significantly from the PPV, t(4)=1.56, p>.19. For all other conditions, significant 
differences were found, indicating that the participants tended to over-respond by different 
degrees to the alarms, with mean response rates of .20 (condition 0.1), t(3)=3.024, p<.06; 0.66 
(condition 0.5), t(6)=3.55, p<.02; and 0.84 (condition 0.7), t(3)=11.43, p<.01. Note that 
similar tendencies of “over responding” were also reported by Bliss et al. (1995). 
A different pattern emerged for responses to nonalarms. As becomes evident from 
Figure 2 (upper right panel) a significant number of direct responses to green lights, indicating 
that participants did not completely rely on the nonalarm signal, were only observed in the 
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condition with the lowest NPV. In all other conditions the mean response rates were below 
10%. The 5(condition) x 2(block) ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition, 
F(4,51)=7.21, p<.01, p2= .36. Post-hoc Scheffé tests revealed that the 0.41 condition differed 
significantly from all other conditions (all p<.03). No other pairwise comparisons between 
other conditions became significant. No main effect block emerged, F(1,51)=2.18, p>.10, 
p2= .04, but a condition x block interaction, F(4,51)=3.04, p<.03, p2= .19. The latter 
indicated that the tendency not to rely on nonalarms in the 0.41 condition even increased in 
the second block. This overall pattern was largely confirmed by an inspection of the 
individual data of the second block (Figure 2 medium right panel). All participants in the 
three conditions with the highest NPVs showed a negative extreme responding, i.e. relied 
completely on the output of the alarm system and did not intervene if the system did not 
indicate a critical state. This only changed in the conditions where the NPV decreased below 
.80. In these conditions a number of participants started to use a mixed strategy and responded 
to a certain number of green lights as if they would have been an alarm. In the condition with 
the lowest NPV (0.41) two participants even used a positive extreme responding strategy in 
the second block indicating a complete breakdown of their reliance on the alarm system’s 
output.  
 
2.2.2. Alarm Task: Overall performance  
The number of overall correct decisions in response to alarms as well as nonalarms are 
displayed in Figure 2 (lower panel). As becomes evident, the number of correct responses to 
alarms (Figure 2, lower left) differed dependent on the degree of uncertainty associated with 
an alarm, i.e. showed a U-shaped relationship with a maximum number of correct responses 
for extreme low and high PPVs and a minimum of correct responses in the condition with a 
medium PPV of the alarms (0.5). This overall shape was the same for both blocks. Yet, the 
number of correct responses improved slightly from block #1 to 2. The data were analyzed by 
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a 5(condition) x 2(block) ANOVA with repeated measures for the second factor. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of alarm reliability, F(4, 51) = 11.58, p < .01, p2= .48 , and 
of block, F(1, 51) = 10.31, p < .01, p2= .17. The condition x block interaction did not become 
significant (F< 2). The number of correct decisions in nonalarm trials also increased slightly 
from block 1 to 2. In addition, it showed an almost perfect linear (inverse) relationship to the 
NPV of the signal. The 5(Condition) x 2(block) ANOVA revealed a main effect of alarm 
reliability, F(4, 51)= 146.83, p<.01, p2= .92, as well as a main effect of block that just 
approached the usual limit of significance, F(1, 51) = 4.015, p=.05, p2= .07. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
2.2.3. Concurrent Task Performance 
Performance in the ROT is illustrated in Figure 3. The number of ordered resources 
increased from block 1 to 2, reflecting some effect of practice, F(1, 51) = 28.04, p< .01, p2= 
.36. In addition, it also depended on the characteristics of the alarm system, F(4, 51) = 3.84, p 
<. 01, p2= .23. As becomes evident from Figure 3, the number of orders sent was higher in 
the three conditions with comparatively low PPVs of emitted alarms (≤ .5) compared to the 
conditions where alarm PPVs were high (0.7; 0.9).  
 
2.3. Discussion  
As expected, response frequencies to alarms were mainly guided by the PPV of the 
alarm system. This is in accordance with earlier findings (Bliss et al. 1995; Getty et al. 1995; 
Meyer 2001). The results also confirm that, dependent on the PPV, different strategies are 
used to cope with the uncertainty of the alarms. However, our specific expectation that 
probability matching would represent the most dominant response strategies for conditions 
with medium levels of PPVs, i.e. 0.3 to 0.7, and extreme responding only in conditions with 
extreme high or low PPVs, was only partially supported  by the data. PPVs of 0.7 and 0.9 led 
most participants to apply the (in this case) most rational positive extreme responding strategy 
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by complying with almost every alarm and even the majority of the few participants who 
applied a mixed strategy in the 0.7 condition still responded to more than 80% of the alarms 
in the expected way. This confirms assumptions of Bliss (2003b) who reported similar results 
based on a meta-analyses of response strategies to alarms with PPVs >0.50.  
More interesting are the effects for the conditions with alarm PPVs≤0.5 which 
correspond more closely to real alarm systems. The results of the detailed analyses of the 
individual response patterns showed that the mean response rates to alarms in these conditions 
actually resulted from three different underlying strategies. A total of 16 of the 35 participants 
in these conditions applied a negative extreme responding strategy, i.e. exhibited an extreme 
cry-wolf effect by ignoring more than 90% of all alarms. This was expected for the 0.1 
condition but a significant number of participants showed this behaviour also in the 0.5 
condition where 50% of all alarms still were  correct. One obvious benefit of ignoring a 
substantial number of alarms in case that alarm validity information is not available, is the 
maximizing of overall correct decisions (human and alarm system). Without access to alarm 
validity information, human operators have no basis other than their general experience with 
the system to discriminate false and true alarms. As a consequence, they principally cannot 
increase the number of correct decisions above what would be achieved by positive extreme 
responding when PPV>0.5 and by negative extreme responding in case of PPV<0.5. Thus, 
extreme responding can be considered a rational choice under these circumstances. A second 
beneficial consequence emerged with respect to concurrent task performance. Ignoring of 
alarms releases resources that can be used to perform concurrent tasks. In the present 
experiment this effect was directly reflected in a somewhat better concurrent task 
performance for conditions with PPV≤0.5.  Most participants in conditions with PPV≤0.5 
obviously decided to ignore at least a significant number of alarms and to focus their attention 
on the ROT instead. Given this, it is particularly remarkable that another 16 participants in the 
conditions with PPV≤0.5 did not apply this rational strategy but a sort of probability 
23 
matching. Actually,  the mean response rates of these participants in the different conditions 
were even a bit higher than the PPVs would suggest. And one participant in each of these 
conditions even applied a positive extreme responding strategy by complying with every 
alarm despite the fact that 50%, 70%, and 90% of these alarms were false. This result is in 
accordance with previous research (Bliss et al. 1995; Bliss 2003b) and suggests that other 
reasons than pure rational considerations play a role in interacting with alarms. Most likely 
these participants were hesitant to just ignore alarms and chose probability matching as a kind 
of compromise to optimize their overall performance in the multi-task setting with, at the 
same time, acknowledging the significance of alarms. 
It has been supposed that the number of false alarms emitted by an alarm system may 
not only lead to a cry wolf effect and thus reduce the compliance with alarms but also affect 
the level of reliance of operators, i.e. the tendency to trust in the system alerting them when a 
critical event occurs (Dixon et al. 2007; Wiczorek et al. 2012). Our results do not provide 
evidence for such effect. Rather they confirm the original assumption of Meyer (2004) and 
results of other research (e.g. Dixon and Wickens 2007) suggesting that compliance and 
reliance are selectively affected by false alarms (PPV) and misses (NPV), respectively. This 
becomes most evident from considering the responses to the green light trials in the three 
conditions where the NPV was comparatively high (i.e. .98, .93 and .86). All participants 
showed high levels of reliance irrespective of the fact that the number of false alarms (and 
PPVs) differed considerably. Only in the most extreme condition where the alarm system 
turned from a false alarm prone to a miss prone system (NPV=0.42) two out of 10 participants 
showed a complete loss of reliance by responding to more than 90% of green light as if it 
were alarms. Note that in this condition the PPV was almost perfect and the alarm system 
emitted only very few false alarms.  
Assessing the overall pattern of results it appears obvious that the finding of negative 
extreme response strategies and cry-wolf effects in response to alarms with PPV≤0.5 might be 
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specific for a situation where the validity of alarms cannot be cross-checked towards other 
system data. In this specific case, extreme responding strategies present the most rational 
choice in order to optimize the overall rate of correct decisions. At least this holds true if the 
consequences of misses do not dramatically outweigh the consequences of false alarms. Note 
that this also means that disuse of alarm systems and cry-wolf effects can reflect a rational 
choice under such circumstances, albeit not with respect to safety. This raises the question to 
what extent decision-making and behavioral strategies in response to alarms would be altered 
if operators got the opportunity to cross-check the validity of a given alarm towards other 
data. On the one hand, this would provide the possibility to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with the output of the alarm system. Yet, on the other hand, it would involve some effort and 
cost effects in terms of time needed for cross-checking. It is hypothesized that cross-checking 
options would be used most often in case of moderate PPVs, and that extreme responding 
strategies would predominate if the PPVs of alarms were very high or low, respectively. That 
is, verification responses should exhibit a sort of inverted U-shaped relationship to PPV while 
the probability to ignore alarms or to directly comply with them should rise with PPVs 
becoming more extreme. This hypothesis was addressed in the second experiment.   
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants  
80 students (40 females, 40 males; mean age = 27.24) participated as paid volunteers 
in the experiment. They received a basic payment of € 7 for their participation and a bonus 
payment of maximal € 15 depending on their performance during the experiment. Screening 
procedures corresponded directly to the ones in the first experiment. 16 participants each were 
randomly assigned to five experimental groups. 
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3.1.2. Task 
The task was the same as in the first experiment with the important difference that the 
participants got access to alarm verification information (AVI). This provided them with the 
opportunity to cross-check the validity of a given output of the alarm system before 
responding, hence eliminating the uncertainty under which a decision had to be make. In 
order to check the raw data, they had to open a specific drop-down menu by clicking on a 
“check”-button and select the container they wanted to cross-check from a list of containers. 
Due to this selection, a coloured image of the heat distribution in the selected container got 
augmented after a delay of two seconds and provided always perfect valid data for a visual 
assessment of the appropriateness of the molecular weight. Once initiated, participants had as 
much time as needed for the cross-check and had to quit it actively by clicking on a “rework” 
or “continue” icon presented in the check menu. To complete this whole procedure took about 
eight seconds and prevented participants to work on the concurrent task.  If the participant did 
not respond within five seconds to a given alarm by either clicking the “rework” or “check” 
icon on the main interface, the container passed the inspection unchanged, and a new 
container appeared.  
 
3.1.3. Design 
The experimental design corresponded in all details to the one of the first experiment. 
 
3.1.4. Dependent Variables 
The same set of variables as in experiment #1 was used to assess the overall 
performance in the AT and the concurrence task (ROT). In addition, the following variables 
were used to describe the individual responses in interaction with the alarm system in the AT: 
(1) the frequency of instances where the participants directly responded to an alarm or 
nonalarm by clicking on the “rework” button; (2) the frequency of ignoring the outputs of the 
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alarm system, and (3) the frequency of trials where the participants cross-checked a given 
alarm or nonalarm against the other available data before they selected their response. Note 
that in this latter case the uncertainty linked to outputs of the alarm system is reduced to zero 
and hence always lead to a correct response.  
 
3.1.5. Procedure and Statistical Analysis 
The procedural details and the approach of statistical analyses corresponded in all 
aspects to the first experiment. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
3.2.1. Alarm Task:  Mean Response Rates and Individual Response Strategies  
Relative proportions of the different possible responses to alarms averaged across the 
two experimental blocks are shown in Figure 4 (upper left quadrant). As expected, the 
tendency to directly comply with an alarm was extremely low for alarms with low PPVs (0.1; 
0.3) but increased considerably across the 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 condition. For the 0.9 condition 
direct compliance with the alarms eventually was the most used response, although even in 
this condition only four/five out of the 16 participants applied a positive extreme responding 
strategy in the first/second block. All other participants just responded directly to a substantial 
percentage of alarms (23-82%), but cross-checked the others before eventually responding in 
the proper way. In all conditions with PPV ≤ 0.7, cross-checking of a given alarm represented 
the dominant sort of response. In contrast to the hypothesis this dominance also was valid for 
the two conditions with the lowest PPV. Actually, the frequency of instances where alarms 
were ignored was very low in these conditions. Only two participants in these conditions 
ignored more than 50% of all alarms in the second block, and not a single participant was 
found to have applied a negative extreme responding strategy. Separate 5(condition) x 
2(block) ANOVAS of the mean frequencies of the three behavioral strategies revealed a 
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significant influence of condition on direct responses, F(4,75) = 29.37 p < .001, p2=.610, and 
cross-checks, F(4,75) = 14.38, p < .001, p2=.434, but not on the frequency by which alarms 
were ignored, F(4,75)=2.22, p>.07, 2=.106. The tendency to ignore alarms even decreased 
from block #1 to block #2, reflected in a significant effect of block, F(1,75) = 6.91, p<.01; . 
p2=.084. Post-hoc Scheffé tests revealed that the frequency of cross-checking alarms did not 
differ among the 0.1 to 0.7 condition, but dropped significantly in the 0.9 condition (all 
contrasts p<0.001). In turn, the frequency of direct compliance with alarms was higher in the 
0.7 and 0.9 conditions compared to all others (all contrasts p<0.05). The condition x block 
interaction did not become significant for either of these variables (all F<1.0).  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
The relative proportions of the three possible kinds of response to nonalarms in the 
different conditions, averaged across the two experimental blocks, are shown in the upper 
right quadrant of Figure 4. As becomes evident, almost no participant ever responded to a 
green light as if it was an alarm. This was also valid for the condition with the lowest NPV 
(0.41) and marks a contrast to the first experiment where this condition had provoked already 
a significant number of such responses. As a consequence, the effects for the other two kinds 
of responses were mirror-inverted. The participants’ reliance on the alarm system, reflected 
by the proportion of events where they refrained from any action in case of a green light (no 
response), decreased significantly with decreasing NPVs, and the proportion of cross-check 
responses naturally showed an inverse pattern of effect. Not surprising, separate 5(condition) 
x 2(block) ANOVAS of the proportion revealed a significant influence of condition on both, 
“no reponse” F(4,75) = 18.78 p < .001, p2=.501, as well as on cross-check responses, F(4,75) 
= 16.56, p < .001, p2=.469. A more detailed analysis of the pattern of effect shown in Figure 
4 suggests that the relationship between reliance and NPV was not linear but rather exhibited 
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a sort of step profile. This is confirmed by post-hoc contrasts (Scheffé) of the proportion of 
instances where participants stayed passive in case of a nonalarm, i.e. showed a high level of 
reliance, in the different conditions. They showed (1) that the level of reliance in the condition 
with the highest NPV (.98) was significantly higher than in all other conditions (all contrasts 
p<.04), (2) that the level of reliance in the conditions with NPV=.93 and NPV=.86 was 
significantly higher than in the condition with NPV=.41 and .72 (all contrasts p<.02). Only 
the contrast between the .72 and .93 condition failed to reach the usual level of significance 
(p<.08). No block x condition interaction was found for either variable (all F<1.0). 
   
3.2.2. Alarm Task: Overall Performance 
The number of overall correct decisions in response to alarms as well as to nonalarm 
events are displayed in the lower half of Figure 4. Correct decisions in response to alarms 
differed significantly dependent on PPV, F(4,75) = 9.09, p<.001, p2 =.326. The percentage 
of correct decisions was very high for the two conditions with lowest PPV (0.1: 98%; 0.3: 
95%), decreased somewhat in the 0.5 condition and was lowest for the two conditions with 
highest PPVs (0.7: 82%, 0.9: 87%). Post-hoc Scheffé tests revealed that performance in the 
0.1 and 0.3 conditions differed significantly from performance in the 0.7 and 0.9 condition, 
respectively (all contrast p< .05). Furthermore, an effect of block was found, F(1,75)=6.97, 
p<.05, p2=.085, indicating a slight performance improvement across the two blocks. No 
interaction condition x block emerged, F(4,75)=1.87, p>.10, p2=.091. For nonalarm trials, 
the percentage of correct responses decreased continuously with decreasing NPV, F(4,75) = 
4.75, p<.01, p2=.216. There was neither a significant main effect of block, F(2,75) = 1.34, 
p>.20, p2=.059, nor a significant interaction, F(2,75) = 1.17, p>.30, p2=.018. 
 
3.2.3. Concurrent Task Performance 
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No significant differences were found in the frequency of correct orders sent by 
participants in the different conditions, F(4,75) = 1.96, p>.10, p2=.095. However, a 
significant main effect of block emerged, F(1,75) = 77.88, p < .001, p2=.509 indicating that 
participants’ concurrent task performance was better in the second block (mean = 64.14 
orders) than in the first one (58.78 orders). The condition x block interaction was not 
significant, F(4,75) = 1.25, p>.20, p2=.062.  
 
3.3. Discussion 
Providing access to alarm validity information (AVI) significantly altered the 
decision-making and response strategies in interaction with the alarm system, compared to the 
first experiment where such possibility was not provided.   
One of the main findings of the first experiment was that two different strategies were 
applied to cope with the uncertainty of given alarms in case that no AVI was available. The 
first one involved a mixed strategy, i.e. the participants responded to a certain percentage of 
alarms in the expected way but ignored others. The second one involved extreme responding 
strategies where participants ignored almost all alarms in case of low PPVs (≤ 0.5) and 
responded to all alarms in case of high PPVs (≥ 0.7). It was hypothesized that providing 
access to AVI would alter this pattern in a way that cross-checking of given alarms would 
exhibit an inverted U-shape function dependent on the PPV of the alarms, and that negative 
and positive extreme responding, in turn would only remain the major response in case of 
extreme low and high PPVs, respectively. This would have been in accordance with similar 
considerations of Bliss (2003b) and  was mainly concluded from the fact that extreme PPVs in 
either direction reduce the level of uncertainty linked with alarms and hence reduce the 
benefit gained by alarm verification (see footnote 1). However, our results only support this 
hypothesis for conditions with PPVs ≥ 0.5. For these conditions, the percentage of direct 
compliance with alarms increased at the expense of cross-checks with increasing PPV. In the 
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condition with the highest PPV direct compliance with alarms eventually represented the most 
used category of responses. Contradicting our expectations and, thus, most remarkable, is the 
finding that participants continued to cross-check almost all alarms in the conditions with low 
PPVs although most of these checks confirmed that the alarm was false. Even in the 0.1 
condition only a minority of participants started to ignore a significant number of alarms and 
no one actually showed indications of negative extreme responding. Instead, cross-checking 
alarms represented the dominant strategy. This suggests an obvious asymmetry in tolerating 
uncertainty associated with alarms, dependent on whether a wrong response would result in a 
miss or a false alarm. Whereas participants in the 0.9 condition obviously tended to accept the 
risk of 10% to commit a false alarm and directly complied with most of the alarms, 
participants in the 0.1 condition avoided the same level of risk to commit a miss by almost 
always cross-checking the alarm instead of just ignoring it. Note, that this asymmetrical 
pattern of effects emerged although the pay-off structure of the experiment treated the 
commitment of both sorts of erroneous decisions the same way. 
Related to this behavior are two consequences. The first one involves the elimination 
of the cry-wolf effect. Whereas ignoring alarms represented a common response to alarms 
with low to medium PPVs if no AVI was available (first experiment), this kind of response 
was hardly ever observed in the current experiment. Obviously, providing AVI represented an 
effective mean to prevent this effect and made participants very cautious and conscientious in 
responding to alarms. This, secondly, produced the somewhat paradoxical effect that the 
overall percentage of correct decisions was better in conditions with medium to low as 
compared to high PPVs. However, the high percentage of cross-checks even of alarms with 
very low PPVs can also be considered as a sort of “over-checking”, which has the drawback 
that it needs effort and, thus, may lead to a waste of resources which otherwise could be 
invested in concurrent tasks. In the current experiment this was reflected in the fact that 
average concurrent task performance, in contrast to experiment 1, i.e. did not profit from a re-
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allocation of resources in the conditions where the PPV of alarms was low. Furthermore, the 
mean number of resources ordered in the three conditions with PPV≤0.5 was lower in the 
current experiment (60.51) than in experiment 1 (74.67). This raises the question whether the 
same asymmetrical effect of cross-checking behavior would also be found in situations where 
the effort needed to verify an alarm or the overall workload would be higher than in the 
current experiment. For example, Bliss and Dunn (2000) showed that an increased workload 
stemming from concurrent tasks can significantly boost the cry-wolf effect, and it might be 
assumed that a similar effect emerges if the verification of alarms becomes more complex. 
This will be explored in experiments #3 and #4.  
However, before turning to these experiments, we shortly want to discuss the effects 
of AVI on the reliance on the alarm system. This aspect has rarely been investigated before. 
As in the first experiment, responses to green light events seem to be mainly determined by 
the NPV which again supports the reliance-compliance distinction (Meyer 2004). Yet, it is 
remarkable that the participants seem to respond especially sensitively to changes in the NPV 
of the nonalarms if AVI is available. This is indicated by the fact that already the small 
difference in NPV between the first two conditions (NPV=.98 vs. .93), which did not provoke 
any visible change of responding behavior in the first experiment, now resulted in a strong 
behavioral effect reflected in a significant increase of cross-checks. This suggests that the 
reliance in an alarm system can already be affected by a very small number of misses and that 
this impact might be stronger than the one of false alarms on compliance.  
 
4. Experiment 3 
The main objective of this experiment was to investigate how an increase of effort 
needed to cross-check given alarms would alter the effects found in the second experiment. It 
was expected that increasing this effort would decrease the proportion of cross-checks 
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particularly in the conditions with extreme low PPVs and extreme low NPVs in favor of direct 
compliance to alarms and no responses to green lights, respectively.   
 
4.1. Method 
 
4.1.1. Participants  
60 students (40 females, 20 males; mean age: 25.98 years) participated in the 
experiment. The screening procedure and compensation directly corresponded to the one used 
in the second experiment. 12 participants each were randomly assigned to the five 
experimental conditions.  
 
4.1.2. Task Environment 
The participants performed the same basic tasks as in the second experiment. 
However, the procedure to cross-check a given output of the alarm system was made more 
complex. Specifically, a complete cross-checking of a given alarm now included the 
inspection of two different parameters, i.e. temperature and pressure. The sequence of 
necessary actions for a cross-check of the temperature status was the same as in experiment 2. 
The additional steps to also check the pressure status involved three more actions which 
corresponded to the procedure of the temperature check, i.e. selecting the correct container 
from a menu, activating a pressure display, waiting for two seconds until the indicated actual 
value could be compared with a nominal value, and clicking on the “rework” button in case 
the pressure needed to be corrected or a “continue” icon in case the pressure was okay. Both 
parameters needed to be checked in order to unambiguously cross-check the validity of a 
given output of the alarm system. Overall, this almost doubled the time needed to cross-check 
a given output of the alarm system (about  14 secs) compared to the procedure in the second 
experiment. 
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4.1.3. Design 
The design corresponded to the one in the second experiment with the exception that 
only one experimental block of 100 trials had to be performed after the familiarization block. 
This was justified by the fact that no significant block x condition effects were found in the 
second experiment for either of the different response categories.  
 
4.1.4. Procedure and Statistical Analysis 
The procedural details and the approach of statistical analysis corresponded to the 
second experiment.  
4.2. Results  
4.2.1. Alarm Task: Mean Response Rates and Response Strategies  
Relative proportions of the different possible responses to alarms are shown in Figure 
5 (upper left quadrant). Again, the pattern of effects was very similar to the effects found in 
the second experiment although a non-significant trend in the expected direction could be 
observed. However, cross-checking of alarms again represented the most often response used 
in conditions 0.1-0.7 and only declined considerably in the 0.9 condition. A univariate 
between-subjects ANOVA of cross-checking rates revealed a main effect of condition, 
F(4,55)=7.57, p<.01, p2 =.395. Post-hoc Scheffé tests showed that the proportion of cross-
checking was higher in the 0.1-0.5 condition than in the 0.9 condition (all p<.02). This effect 
was mirrored by the results for direct compliance with alarms which was rarely observed in 
the conditions with medium and low PPVs but considerably increased in the 0.7 and 0.9 
condition, F(4,55)=17.81, p<.01, p2 =.71. Post-hoc contrasts showed that the percentage of 
alarms directly responded to were higher in the 0.9 condition than in all other conditions (all 
p<.03), higher in the 0.7 than in the 0.1 condition (p<.02), and tentatively higher in the 0.7 
than in the 0.3 condition (p<.08). In contrast, only a comparatively weak impact of PPV with 
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respect to the strength of effect was found on the proportion of alarms ignored by the 
participants, F(4.55)=2.59, p<.05, p2 =.158. Yet, post-hoc  Scheffé tests did not become 
significant for any pairwise comparison.  This pattern of mean response rates described very 
well the findings on individual level. Inspection of individual data revealed that only three out 
of the 60 participants (one each in the 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 condition) showed a significant cry-
wolf effect by ignoring more than 80% of all alarms.  In contrast, six participants in the 0.9 
condition and two participants in the 0.7 condition exhibited positive extreme responding. All 
others cross-checked a significant number of alarms before choosing their response. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Results for the relative proportion of the three possible ways to respond to nonalarms 
are shown in the upper right quadrant of Figure 5. Again the overall pattern mirrored more or 
less the pattern found in the second experiment with the important exception that in the 
condition with the lowest NPV an increase of direct responses to green lights was observed. 
This resulted in a main effect of condition for this response category in a univariate between-
subjects ANOVA, F(4,55)=2.57, p<.05, p2 =1.57. However, inspection of the raw data 
revealed that this was due to only two out of the 12 participants in this experimental group 
who responded to more than 90% of green lights in this manner. The effects for the other two 
response categories resembled the effects found in the second experiment, albeit less extreme. 
Reliance on green lights was highest in the condition with the highest NPV and declined with 
decreasing NPVs, F(4,55)=9.121, p<.01, p2 =.399. Post-hoc Scheffé tests revealed 
significant differences between the 0.98 and 0.72 condition (p<.05), the 0.98 and 0.41 
condition (p<.01), and the 0.93/0.86 conditions and the 0.41 condition (p<.01). The effect for 
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cross-checking events showed an inverted pattern, F(4,55)=4.13, p<.01, p2 =.231, with a 
significant post-hoc test only for comparison of conditions 0.41 and 0.98. 
In order to explore in more detail to what extent the use of cross-checks was affected 
by raising the check-effort, we compared the effects for cross-checking of alarms and 
nonalarms with those found in the second experiment (averaged across blocks). A 
2(experiment) x 5(condition) between-subjects ANOVA revealed significant main effects of 
experiment for both cross-checks of alarms, F(1,130)=4.57, p<.04, p2 =.034,  as well as 
nonalarms,  F(1,130)=12.69, p<.01, p2 =.085, reflecting that the average number of cross-
checks was somewhat lower in the third experiment. However, most important, the 
experiment x condition interaction did not become significant for either variable, both F<1.0, 
supporting the similarity of effects across conditions described above.       
 
4.2.2. Alarm Task: Overall Performance 
The number of overall correct decisions in response to alarms as well as to nonalarms 
are displayed in the upper half of Figure 5. Corresponding to the results of experiment #2, the 
percentage of correct responses to alarms was highest in the 0.1 condition and declined with 
increasing PPV, F(4,55)= 2.76, p<.04, p2 =.167. However, post-hoc Scheffé tests only 
proved the difference between the 0.1 and 0.7 condition to be marginally significant (<.09). 
For nonalarm trials, the percentage of correct responses decreased continuously with 
decreasing NPV, F(4,55) = 13.27, p<.01, p2=.491. Post-hoc contracts revealed significant 
differences between the 0.98/0.93 and 0.86/0.41 conditions, respectively (p<.01), as well as 
between the 0.5 and 0.9 condition (p<.04). 
 
4.2.3. Concurrent Task Performance 
No significant performance differences across conditions were found for performance 
in the ROT: F<1.0. On average the participants placed 58.98 correct orders. 
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4.3. Discussion  
The results replicated the findings of the second experiment. Only few indications 
were found that doubling the effort for verification of given outputs of the alarm system 
would reduce the number of cross-checks. Notably, these became more obvious in responses 
to green lights, i.e. the reliance aspect, than in responses to alarms. Obviously the effort 
needed to cross-check a given output of the alarm system increased the reliance on the 
system’s output but did not affect the compliance to the same extent. Although some trends 
also emerged with respect to compliance with alarms which were in line with the expectation 
(e.g. more ignored alarms in the 0.1 condition and more compliance in the 0.7 condition), they 
remained non-significant. Moreover, also the asymmetry effect found in the previous 
experiment, i.e. the tendency to rather accept the (low) risk of an erroneous response by 
complying with an alarm with a high PPV, as by ignoring an alarm with a very low PPV, did 
not become affected by raising the cross-check effort. Overall, this can be taken as evidence 
for the stability of effects found for compliance with alarms in the second experiment. Yet, it 
remains an open question whether this also would be valid for the situation where the overall 
workload imposed by concurrent tasks would be higher. As is suggested by research of, e.g., 
Bliss and Dunn (2000) and McBride, Rogers and Fisk (2011), increments of workload can 
affect the compliance with decision aids like alarms. Accordingly it might be assumed that 
raising the overall workload would lead operators to exhibit more extreme responding to 
alarms with extreme high and low PPVs even though AVI is available. This hypothesis was 
explored in the fourth experiment.  
 
5. Experiment 4 
 
5.1. Method 
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5.1.1. Participants  
60 students (35 females, 25 males, mean age: 25.97 years) participated in the 
experiment and were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions, 12 participants each. 
Screening procedure and compensation directly corresponded to experiments #2 and #3.  
 
5.1.2. Task Environment 
As in the former two experiments the M-TOPS-A environment was used as simulation 
environment. However, in order to increase the overall workload, all three tasks of M-TOPS-
A had to be performed concurrently.  
 
5.1.3. Design 
The design corresponded to the one in the third experiment.  
 
5.1.4. Procedure and Statistical Analysis 
The procedure and the approach of statistical analysis corresponded to the other 
experiments. However, the pay-off rules were enlarged by including the third task. As in the 
three previous experiments, participants received 1.5 points for every correct order of 
chemicals in the ROT they gained and lost two points for correct and false decisions in the 
AT, and were granted 7.5 points for every completed set of containers in the CET. This payoff 
pattern should support equal treatment of the three tasks, taking into account that completing a 
full refilling cycle in the CET took much longer than single trials of the ROT and AT.   
5.2. Results  
5.2.1. Alarm Task:  Mean Response Rates and Response Strategies  
Frequencies of the different possible responses to alarms are shown in Figure 6 (upper 
left quadrant). The pattern of effects revealed some obvious differences compared to the 
effects found in the second experiment. Direct compliance with alarms was lowest in the 0.1 
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condition but started to increase already in the 0.3 condition and represented the major 
category of responses not only in the 0.9 but also in the 0.7 condition. A univariate between-
subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition, F(4,55)=13.06, p<.01, p2 =.487. 
Post-hoc contrasts (Scheffé) showed that the percentage of direct responses were higher in the 
0.7 and 0.9 conditions than in the 0.1 and 0.3 conditions (all p<.01). Another difference was 
found for “no response” events. These were rarely observed in conditions with PPV of 0.3-0.9 
but increased considerably in the 0.1 condition, F(4,55)=6.95, p<.01, p2 =.336. Post-hoc 
contrasts showed that the percentage of alarms not responded to was higher in the 0.1 than in 
all other conditions (all p<.05). Actually, three of the 12 participants in this condition 
exhibited negative extreme responding by ignoring more than 90% of the alarms. Cross-
checking of alarms represented the major category only in the 0.3 and 0.5 condition but was 
less observed in the other condition, F(4,55)=5.68, p<.01, p2 =.292. Yet, post-hoc Scheffé 
tests only revealed the differences between the 0.3 conditions and the 0.7/ 0.9 condition to be 
significant (all p<.02). Comparing the effects for alarm verification across conditions with 
those found in the second experiment by means of a 2(experiment) x 5(condition) between-
subjects ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of condition, F(1,130)=19.92, p<.01, 
p2 =.133, as well as a significant experiment x condition interaction, F(4,55)=3.24, p<.02, 
p2 =.091. 
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Results for the frequency of the three possible kinds to respond to nonalarms are 
shown in the upper right quadrant of Figure 6. Almost no participant did ever respond to a 
green light as if it was an alarm. As a consequence the patterns for the other two response 
categories were directly inverted to each other. The level of reliance as reflected in the 
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proportion of green lights which were neither responded to nor cross-checked decreased 
continuously with decreasing NPV, F(4,55)=17.17, p<.01, p2 =.555. Post-hoc Scheffé tests 
confirmed that reliance in the condition with the highest NPV was significantly higher than in 
the two conditions with lowest NPV (p<.01). In addition, also the comparisons between the 
condition with NPV=.41 and the conditions with NPV=.86 and .72 became significant 
(p<.05). The general pattern of this effect resembled the pattern found in the second and third 
experiment with the important exception that the level of reliance remained high for both 
conditions with NPV>.90. Compared to the second experiment, where already a decrement of 
NPV from .98 to .93 led to a significant increase of the percentage of cross-checked green 
lights from zero up to about 40%, the same change of NPV only led to a negligible increase to 
about 9% in the present experiment. This difference resulted in a significant main effect of 
experiment, F(1,130)=20.31, p<.01, p2 =.135, as well as a significant experiment x condition 
interaction, F(1,130)=2.87, p<.03, p2 =.081, when we compared the effects of the second and 
current experiment by means of a 2(experiment) x 5(condition) between-subjects ANOVA. 
 
5.2.2. Alarm Task: Overall Performance 
The number of overall correct decisions in response to alarms as well as to no-alarm 
events are displayed in the upper half of Figure 6. Correct decisions in response to alarms 
differed significantly dependent on PPV, F(4,55) = 6.93, p<.001, p2 =.335. The percentage 
of correct decisions was highest in the 0.1 condition and decreased almost linearly with 
increasing PPV except a small improvement in the 0.9 condition. Post-hoc Scheffé tests 
revealed that performance in the 0.1 conditions differed significantly from performance in the 
0.5 and 0.7 condition, respectively (both contrasts p< .02). In addition, the contrast between 
the 0.3 and 0.7 condition just failed to reach the conventional level of significance (p=.051). 
For nonalarm trials, the percentage of correct responses decreased continuously with 
decreasing NPV, F(4,55) = 11.96, p<.01, p2=.465. Post-hoc contracts revealed significant 
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differences between the 0.1 and 0.7/0.9 condition (p<.01) and the 0.3 and 0.9 condition 
(p<.05). 
 
5.2.3. Concurrent Task Performance 
No significant performance differences across conditions were found in either of the 
two concurrent tasks, ROT: F(4,55)=1.65, p>.15, p2 =.107; CET: F<1.0. Averaged across 
conditions, a mean of 49.68 orders were sent correctly in the ROT, and 11.77 cycles of 
coolant exchange were completed in the CET.   
 
5.3. Discussion  
It was expected that raising the workload imposed by concurrent tasks would lead 
operators to choose extreme responding strategies to alarms with extreme high and low PPVs 
even though AVI is available. The results of the fourth experiment at least partially support 
this hypothesis. In contrast to the second experiment where cross-checking of alarms was 
found to be by far the most often used response across a large range of PPVs (0.1-0.7), 
participants now started to comply directly with most of the alarms already in the condition 
with PPV= 0.7 and ignored the majority of alarms in the 0.1 condition. These behavioral 
aspects resembled the situation where no AVI was available (first experiment) and suggest 
that participants facing high workload started to trust in the output of the alarm system more 
than in situations where the overall workload was lower (second experiment). This effect is in 
accordance with previous findings of Bliss and Dunn (2000) who reported an increasing 
tendency of cry-wolf effect in response to a high false alarm rate if overall workload was high. 
It is further in line with results of Biros, Daly, and Gunsch (2004) and McBride et al. (2011) 
who found that increased level of workload led to increments of compliance with moderately 
reliable (.60-.70) decision aids in different contexts.  
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A similar effect also was found for the reliance aspect. Compared to the second 
experiment, where already a decrement of NPV from .98 to .93 led to a significant increase of 
the percentage of cross-checked green lights, the same change of NPV just entailed a very 
weak behavioural effect in the present experiment. Even in the conditions with NPV=.72 only 
about 30% of green lights were checked. This result suggests that the level of reliance on the 
output of the alarm system became much higher in the current experiment with high overall 
workload as compared to the second experiment where workload imposed by concurrent tasks 
was significantly lower.  
To some extent the results suggests that the raised overall workload provoked a more 
rational decision-making and response selection in case of extreme PPVs and NPVs. 
Nevertheless, the previously found asymmetry of acceptance of uncertainty in interaction with 
alarms also persisted to some extent in the current experiment. This becomes evident by 
comparing the proportions of alarm verifications in the 0.3 and 0.7 conditions. Although the 
risk to commit an erroneous decision was the same by ignoring a given alarm in the 0.3 
condition as compared to comply with it in the 0.7 condition, the number of alarm verification 
was found to be significantly higher in the former than the latter conditions. This corresponds 
to the finding of “over-checking” behavior in the second and third experiment.   
6. General Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of the four experiments provide clear empirical evidence for the 
assumption outlined in the introduction that PPV and NPV are crucial triggers for 
participants’ decision-making and response selection in interaction with alarms. Overall, this 
finding confirms similar results reported by Getty et al. (1995). Given the fact that the 
technical characteristics of the alarm system (i.e. d’, response bias) remained essentially the 
same and the differences of PPV (NPV) were just induced by changing the base rates of 
critical events, the results further empirically supports the claim made by Parasuraman et al. 
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(1997) that the same alarm systems can entail very different behavioural effects dependent on 
the a priori probabilities of critical events.  
However, the specific response characteristics are highly dependent on whether or not 
AVI is available. In the case that a cross-checking of the output of the alarm system is not 
possible, the decision how to respond to it represents a decision under uncertainty with the 
level of uncertainty directly reflected by PPV and NPV. The results of the first experiment 
suggest that humans take these differences into account in their decision-making, i.e. adapt 
their behavioural strategies to the level of uncertainty of alarms and nonalarms. This was most 
true for high PPVs and NPVs (≥0.7) where the vast majority of participants in the first 
experiment applied an extreme responding strategy by complying with all alarms and not 
responding to nonalarms, thereby accepting the small risks to commit a false alarm or to miss 
a critical event. However, a more diverse set of strategies was found in case that the PPVs of 
the alarms were ≤0.5. In this case two subgroups were found. The first one applied a negative 
extreme responding by not responding to 90% or more of all alarms. The second group 
showed a sort of mixed strategy, i.e. responded to a certain percentage of alarms and only 
ignored the others. Obviously, participants choosing this strategy are reluctant to stay passive 
in case of alarms and think that they can compensate to some extent the unreliability of the 
alarm system and to meet real critical events by chance. However, such strategy does not 
reflect a rational choice. This is given by the fact that without access to AVI human operators 
do not have any information which would enable them to discriminate false and true alarms. 
As a consequence, they principally cannot increase the number of correct decisions by some 
strategy above that which would be achieved by positive extreme responding when PPV>0.5 
and negative extreme responding in case of PPV<0.5. In the first experiment this became 
evident in the percentage of overall (human and alarm system) correct responses. Due to the 
fact that a substantial number of participants chose a sort of probability matching in 
conditions with PPV<0.5, the mean number of correct decisions in these conditions did not 
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reach those which were to be expected if all alarms were ignored. However, a better record 
was achieved for conditions with PPV>0.5 where the vast majority of participants applied a 
positive extreme responding strategy.   
Two practical implications might be derived from these results for situations where 
AVI cannot be made available. First, for environments where alarm systems with  PPVs 
greater than 0.5 are technically feasible, there is no real need to keep human operators in the 
loop, and the best choice would be to fully automate the response to alarms. This is suggested 
by the fact that human operators would tend to respond to all alarms anyway. Second, for 
conditions with alarm PPVs<0.5, strategies that involve at least to some extent a cry-wolf 
effect seem to represent the most probable and, to a high degree, also rational choice. This has 
particular implications for situations where misses are much more consequential than false 
alarms like in high risk environments (e.g. power plants or airplanes). In these situations, 
human operators should get clear and binding orders what to do in case of an alarm or 
nonalarm, instead of leaving this decision with them.  Specifically direct responses to each 
alarm independent of its PPV should be requested, as well as careful repeated monitoring of 
raw data in case that a high NPV of an alarm system cannot be assured. Note that the former, 
e.g., is the usual prescription of responses to outputs of the traffic alert and avoidance system 
(TCAS) in cockpits of commercial airplanes and also the most applied procedure in control 
rooms of chemical plants. Another possibility is the provision of what has been referred to as 
likelihood alarm systems (Sorkin, Kantowitz and Kantowitz 1988). These sorts of systems 
provide a more distinct information about the relative likelihood of critical events and 
haveshown to improve decision-making significantly if other informations sources are not 
available (Wiczorek and Manzey 2014).  
The situation changes if AVI is available. Investigating the behavioural effects of AVI 
availability was the major focus of the present research. Providing AVI offers the possibility 
to reduce the uncertainty linked to outputs of the alarm system before selecting a response. 
44 
Therefore it was assumed that the option to cross-check outputs of the alarms system before 
responding would be mostly chosen in cases where this uncertainty is comparatively high, i.e 
with medium PPVs and NPVs, but not if the uncertainty is low. The results of the second 
experiment supported this assumption only for the upper parts of PPV and NPV range, i.e. 
PPV and NPV > 0.7. For the lower part of the investigated PPV range, which is more realistic 
for characteristics of alarm systems in the field, cross-checking of the outputs of the alarm 
system remained the major response even in the condition where 90% of all alarms were 
false. This general effect also persisted when the effort to check the AVI was increased. 
Although some indications were found that doubling the check effort indeed reduced the 
checking of AVI in response to alarms as well as green lights (third experiment), this 
reduction was only small and occurred in all conditions, i.e. did not change the overall pattern 
of effects. This only changed if the overall workload imposed by concurrent task was 
increased (fourth experiment). This intervention eventually led to results that were more close 
to expectations. In accordance with previous findings of Bliss and Dunn (2000) participants 
who had to perform two tasks (instead of one) concurrently to the AT started to comply with 
and ignore more alarms in case the PPV was extremely high or low, respectively. For the case 
of extreme low PPV this involved the “re-appearance” of the cry-wolf effect even with AVI 
available. However, independent of the raised workload, cross-checking remained to be the 
major response for alarms with a PPV as low as 0.3. This is in accordance with the 
assumption stated earlier by Bliss (2003b) that AVI generally would reduce extreme 
responding behaviour and has several implications.  
It suggests that providing AVI that can be easily checked, combined with keeping the 
overall workload of operators on moderate levels can significantly reduce the cry-wolf effect 
which constitutes one of the major issues of the “psychology of false alarms” (Breznitz 1984). 
This insight contributes to the current discussion on the significance of the cry-wolf effect in 
different fields (e.g. Lees and Lee 2007; Wickens et al. 2009). Furthermore, the finding that 
45 
our participants tended to “over-check” alarms in case of extreme low but not in case of 
extreme high PPVs suggests that the tolerance of uncertainty in interaction with alarms differs 
dependent on the sort of error which might result from a wrong decision. That is, humans are 
obviously more motivated to reduce the uncertainty associated with the output of an alarm 
system if an erroneous action would lead to a miss than to a false alarm. Indications of this 
asymmetry were found in all experiments where AVI was available and, thus, emerged 
independent on check effort and overall workload. On first sight, this might be regarded as an 
obvious (and safety oriented) behavioural effect in interaction with alarm systems. 
Independent of the pay-off structure which provided the same penalties for misses and false 
alarms in the experiments reported above, the participants might have perceived the risk of 
committing a miss as higher as the one of a false alarm. This might have also been supported 
by the cover story that they would be operators in a chemical plant. However, also a more 
general effect might be responsible for this finding. Committing an erroneous decision by 
complying with an alarm might be perceived as less detrimental than committing an error by 
ignoring the alarm. Such “psychological bias” might not be specific for alarm systems but 
could be valid for all kinds of automated decision aids (e.g. navigation systems in cars). That 
is, humans interacting with a decision aid might be biased to actively respond to the aid in the 
expected way and perceive even committing an error by complying with a system as more 
tolerable than making a false decision by just ignoring the automated cue. A similar effect has 
been described in other decision-making contexts and referred to as “action bias” (e.g. Bar-Eli 
et al. 2007). First results from another series of experiments in our lab provide support for this 
assumption (Guenzler and Manzey 2013) but more research will be needed before such far-
reaching claim can be made.  
A final conclusion regards the distinction of two behavioural indicators of dependence 
on alarm systems, i.e. compliance and reliance (Meyer 2004). The results of all four 
experiments show that participants discriminated between these two aspects in a 
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straightforward manner. No obvious evidence of cross-effects between the effects of false 
alarms and misses on compliance and reliance were found. This provides support for the 
assumption and previous findings that these two behavioral aspects represent largely 
independent behavioural consequences of alarms and nonalarms (Dixon and Wickens 2006; 
Meyer 2004; Meyer and Bitan 2011; Wickens and Colcombe 2007). However, it contrasts 
some recent results at least suggesting that reliance might be affected by both false alarms and 
misses (Dixon et al. 2007; Wiczorek et al. 2012). Admittedly, the current experiments were 
not specifically designed to investigate the dependence of both aspects and, thus, more 
research will be needed to explore possible moderating factors which might affect the 
dependence-independence of both aspects. 
 
7. Limitations 
The present research has been based on laboratory experiments using a sort of micro-
world task. Whereas this ensured a high level of internal validity of the effects reported, it 
suffers from the usual disadvantages of laboratory research in terms of reduced complexity 
compared to real-world settings and, thus, limited external validity.  First, the current research 
considered decision-making to single binary alarms, mainly based on probability information 
in terms of PPV and NPV. Thus, the complexity of decision-making usually found in the field 
was considerably reduced. Specifically, other relevant context factors than just probability 
information, or aspects like dealing with multiple more or less connected alarms, were not 
taken into account. Moreover, the model chosen for our research included the most basic form 
of alarm system, i.e. a simple binary threshold detector whereas in the field also more 
complex systems are available (e.g., Pritchett 2001). Thus, our findings might only be 
externally valid for situations where operators have to interact with single binary alarm 
systems in contexts where their experiences concerning the probability of false alarms and 
misses represent the main basis for their decision-making and response selection. Second, 
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direct responding to a valid or false alarm in our paradigm only included the click on a re-
work button . This does not compare to real-world settings where responding to alarms 
usually involves much work. It cannot be excluded that this characteristic of the current 
studies has led to an overestimation of direct compliance with alarms in the upper PPV range. 
Furthermore, the risks usually associated with misses and false alarms in the field are rarely 
known in detail and often unbalanced in a way that misses are much more consequential than 
false alarms. In our series of experiments, the pay-off structure underlying erroneous 
decisions was completely transparent, and false alarms were treated as consequential as 
misses. This might have affected in particular the observation of high percentages of ignored 
alarms in the first experiment already in conditions with moderate PPVs. Finally, the AVI 
provided in experiments 2-4 always reduced the uncertainty involved in the decision-making 
process to zero. Admittedly this also was a specific characteristic of our laboratory research  
that   does not apply to all real-world settings. Thus, it remains an open question to what 
levels consulting AVI must reduce uncertainty in order to evoke the behavioural effects 
observed in the present research. 
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Table 1:  Experimental conditions (between subjects) of experiment 1 
Groups Number of 
Participants 
Base Rate 
of Critical 
Events 
Characteristics of Alarm System 
d’ c PPV  NPV 
1  12 .05  1.09 -0.29 .10 .98 
2  11 .18 1.09 -0.29 .30 .93 
3 12 .33 1.09 -0.29 .50 .86 
4 11 .54 1.09 -0.29 .70 .72 
5 10 .81 1.09 -0.29 .90 .41 
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Figure Captions  
Figure 1: User interface of M-TOPS 2 with ROT (upper left quadrant), CET (upper right 
quadrant) and AT (lower right quadrant). The figure shows the version used in experiment 1, 
i.e. without possible access to alarm validity information in the AT. Figure 2: Results of 
experiment #1. Upper panel: Means and standard errors of proportions of direct “rework” 
responses to alarms (left) and nonalarms (right) across experimental conditions and the two 
experimental blocks. Medium panel: Percentage of participants showing negative extreme 
responding, positive extreme responding and mixed strategies as defined in the text (only the 
second experimental block considered). Lower panel: Means and standard errors for overall 
correct decisions in response to alarms left) and nonalarms (right) across conditions for the 
two different experimental blocks. 
Figure 3: Concurrence tasks performance in experiment #1. Shown are means and standard 
errors oft correct resource orders sent in the ROT for the five different conditions and the two 
blocks.   
Figure 4: Results of experiment #2. Upper panels: Means and standard errors of proportions 
of different kinds of responses to alarms (left) and nonalarms (right). Lower panels: Means 
and standard errors for overall correct decisions in response to alarms (left) and nonalarms 
(right). 
Figure 5: Results of experiment #3. Upper panels: Means and standard errors of proportions 
of different kinds of responses to alarms (left) and nonalarms (right). Lower panels: Means 
and standard errors for overall correct decisions in response to alarms (left) and nonalarms 
(right). 
Figure 6: Results of experiment #4. Upper panels: Means and standard errors of proportions 
of different kinds of responses to alarms (left) and nonalarms (right). Lower panels: Means 
and standard errors for overall correct decisions in response to alarms (left) and nonalarms 
(right). 
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